
Framing China: A Comparative Study of Geopolitical Bias in U.S. And Chinese Generative AI Systems

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ABSTRACT

The swift dissemination of large language models (LLMs) in the world, such as Copilot by Microsoft, ChatGPT by OpenAI, Gemini by Google, Claude by Anthropic, and Deep Seek in China, has questioned the conventional views on the neutrality of knowledge generation. Even though the systems are commonly seen as objective sources of information, their products are shaped by the political and ideological spheres in which they are created. Five dominant models (four of them are Western and one is Chinese) are discussed in this paper as an evaluation of the ways in which they put sensitive issues concerning China into context. The paper examines their answers on leadership, human rights, state surveillance and foreign policy through qualitative content analysis. Essentially, there is a noticeable divergence, Western paradigms are more inclined to perceive China as an authoritarian and strategically aggressive nation and raises concerns regarding rights and governance, whereas DeepSeek agrees with the official policies of the Chinese state, values stability, sovereignty, economic growth, and security. The research is based on the principles of constructivist and Foucauldian approaches and proposes that LLMs influence the global discourse and suggest a more open and embracing approach to AI regulations.

Key Words: Large Language Models (LLMs), AI Governance, Geopolitical Narratives, China Relations, Algorithmic Bias

Introduction

AI is a new technology that has transformed the way data and information are processed in the 21st century. In a few years, large language models (LLMs) became more of a commodity than an experimental project, replacing tutors, being useful in research, emulating creativity, and providing critical information to hundreds of millions. ChatGPT, Microsoft Copilot, Anthropic Claude, and Google Gemini have never experienced so much widespread use of AI systems since they are incredibly popular because of their fantastic understanding of text and their capability to generate coherent, reliable, and human-sounding answers. Their authors tend to market these systems as instruments of democratizing knowledge by claiming that their solutions are objective, are factual, and that they are not man-made. Nevertheless, this impression of objectivity, which is central to their commercial success and acceptance in the society, conceals a more complex and more painful truth: generative AI is not an objectively minded instrument. Rather, it is a socio-technical system that is inherently influenced by the social and political surrounding contexts under which it is created hence revealing its biases and influences. This can be seen when the geopolitical hot-button topics are taken by the LLMs, and few are as complicated and hotly discussed as the politics and policies of the People Republic of China. Being a fast-developing world power and a state with a distinct political structure, China is the object of high levels of scrutiny that present it in a rather contradictory manner. The description of the leadership of China, its human rights policies in Xinjiang, its political freedoms, or its international ambitions is more than just algorithms and a product of the prevalent discourses in its training data, as well as the judgment biases made in training alignment. The obvious gap between the Western and Chinese stories on such issues demonstrates the geopolitical biases of AI. Having been mostly trained with English papers of liberal democracies, Western platforms view the policies of China as authoritarian, with

infringement of human rights and strategic aggression. In contrast, Chinese sites such as DeepSeek, which were created under the severe regulation and ideological repression of the CCP, are more likely to focus on nationalist, legalistic, and socioeconomic descriptions, which in many cases are very close to the official state propaganda. This paper states that this divergence cannot be attributed to accidental occurrence. Through constructivist and critical IR theory, we argue that the geopolitics and international relations are now separate entities thanks to the contribution of generative AI systems. They are not only reflections of the world but also contribute to the formation of the world. The western models embrace and enhance the liberal human rights standards, whereas the Chinese models embrace and enhance the national concern of safety and sovereignty. The following questions are to be answered in this research: 1) What is the systematic difference between Western-trained and Chinese-trained LLMs in framing sensitive issues of Chinese politics? 2) What are the exact linguistic and rhetorical tactics of these models in constructing their counter-narrations? 3) What is the role of international relations theories to explain AI as a new language of geopolitical communication? To address these questions, this paper will provide a comparative overview, in a systematic and empirical manner, of how big five market LLMs model controversial political problems, providing concrete evidence of bias in their ideological perspective. It then places these results in the context of a solid theoretical framework, relying on the constructivist and Foucauldian insights to answer how and why the AI models are used as an instrument in discursive power games. Lastly, by bringing out the high ideological biases that exist in the present AI systems, this paper argues that there is need to urgently adopt a more democratic, transparent, and varied approach to AI governance. It is only through the acknowledgment of the biases these powerful technologies possess that policymakers, developers and users will start to work towards the creation of a more balanced and globally representative information ecosystem. The paper will be structured in the following manner: at the beginning, the literature

review section will discuss the AI bias architecture, the applicable IR theories, second, the methodology section will describe the approach of the comparative analysis, third, the analysis section will present the different narratives of the models in the theme-by-theme fashion, fourth, a discussion will be provided to tie the findings with the theoretical framework, and to speculate on the wider implications of this connection; and lastly, the conclusion section would summarise the main points and make future policy and research recommendations.

Literature Review

The old debate on science and technology makes the question whether technology can be neutral or not, and generative AI is no exception. Although the mathematics of LLMs is perhaps value-free, its use is not. Prejudice may be infused at any point of the development of an AI model, including the data gathering phase to the deployment phase. The training data is the major source of bias. As an example, ChatGPT, like other models, is trained on massive datasets including some variants of the Common Crawl corpus, the text scraped by internet robots with millions of petabytes. These collections are not entirely representative of reality; they are biased reflections of what has been digitized, published and preserved, predominantly in English and primarily of North American and European origin. Such digital pre-eminence inherently gives more attention to the norms and values of liberal democracies and does not reflect the perspectives of other regions. Indeed, such data will likely result in a model identifying such concepts as democracy and human rights as the default or universal form of these concepts, respectively.

The second and more deliberate level of bias is made during the alignment process mainly by the Reinforcement Learning system via Human Feedback (RLHF) and similar procedures. During this step, human labellers evaluate and rank the outputs of the model to make it more helpful, harmless and honest. But the interpretation of these terms is based on

cultural and ideological views. A human rater in California, in accordance with an ethics policy of a Silicon Valley technology firm, could declare a defence of the Xinjiang policy of China, as harmful misinformation or a human rights violation. In the meantime, a rater in Beijing, in a society where he or she is subject to rigid government control, would likely regard the text itself as true and useful and view attack on the text as dangerous material likely to shake societal stability. This is supposed to enhance safety and, by default, creates model vehicles of a particular worldview of the annotators as well as those who employ the annotators (organizations or governments). It is this correspondence which causes the crude statistical forms of the training material to be melted out into a uniform and ideologically charged personality. Measures of this phenomenon have commenced empirically.

The research conducted by (Huang et al., 2025a) was a solid source of evidence because it directly compared DeepSeek and ChatGPT and presented much greater percentages of both propaganda and anti-U.S. bias in the Chinese model. This was defined by the research as an invisible loudspeaker effect, where an AI model is really just a synthesis, but a strong amplifier of specific geopolitically motivated discourses (Select Committee on the CCP, 2024). These results confirm that AI models are not an ideologically neutral synthesizers, but a strong booster of selected, geopolitically driven discourses. In explaining the geopolitical consequences of AI bias, it is necessary to rely on the literature on international relations that prioritize the concept, norms, and language. Constructivist IR theory is a theory that is often linked to (E-International Relations, 2020). Click or tap here to enter text. Offers a powerful point of view. The primary concept of Wendt that states create anarchy means that the basic outlines of world politics are not material but social. States can be observed as entities that operate based on their identities and interests which are not predetermined but are acquired in the process of the constant social intercourse and mutual understanding.

To take one instance, the United States views the United Kingdom nuclear weapons differently as compared to the ones of North Korea not due to the material qualities of the weapons, but due to the history, norms and identity shared that creates a friendship relationship as opposed to one of hostility. In the case of generative AI, constructivism implies that LLMs are now new and highly scalable agents in the process of social construction. A model created by AI based on textual artifacts of such interactions forms a certain social reality. Whenever a Western AI keeps telling us that China is an authoritarian country, it is not necessarily an objective fact but rather, it contributes to the creation of the Chinese identity as the illiberal other. In its turn, this created identity influences the interest of Western states to China, which promotes the policy of containment, competition, or its moral condemnation. In the same way, by creating an identity of China as a growing and peaceful state of the world that is being victimized by the West, DeepSeek makes the CCP policies legitimate and generates domestic and overseas support. The AI does not simply narrate an already existing geopolitical competition; it is itself defining the common meanings around it.

Similar observations are possible in the post-structuralist and Foucauldian theory, which highlights the close and fruitful interaction between knowledge and power. Foucault sees power not only as a top-down force that is coercive but as a generative and ubiquitous force that operates through discursive systems of language, thought and practice that constitute what is valid, regular and legitimate. Such regimes of truth justify certain practices (such as a humanitarian intervention), and de-justify others (such as a violation of sovereignty). The strength of methods of generating AI systems is arguably the most potent creation in history that promotes and legitimizes discourses. By referring to the camps in Xinjiang, as a vocational training centre, DeepSeek just explains that this is the truth as told by the CCP, and it is justified using language of law, security, and economic development as its justification. In his turn, the

use of the word genocide by Gemini presents a powerful Western discourse based on the international human rights law and moral judgement. The two terms are rhetorical devices in the competition of the way empirical reality is put to a given frame; they are both neutral descriptions. The fact that AI language models come up with a verdict in the seeming manner of objectivity and polishing gives them the power of truth claims, which strengthens the discursive regimes that inform our perception of the world. The extended meaning of algorithmic governmentality can help to effectively study this application of AI. In this case, sovereign and disciplinary control is replaced with distributed and calculative processes occurring on digital interfaces. Such systems are not influential by direct command but by modifying the form of discourses available, by transforming the questions the users pose, and by lessening the parameters of the plausible interpretation.

As algorithms make some of the narratives seem to be normative, tacitly authoritative, and implicitly the correct ones, they drive user actions towards constrained political results, all without seeming like coercion. The difference in operation of Western and Chinese AI systems can be better observed in the backdrop of the increasing Sino-Western geopolitical and digital imbalance. The internet is no longer a united, common place and is now dividing into different governance areas, what is often said to be the splinternet. The digital sovereignty pursuits have institutionalized this division in China via the Great Firewall, data localization policy, and industry-specific policies that serve to make the country an enclosed domestic information space that is free of foreign interference and geared towards the enforcement of CCP ideological agenda.

In addition to a new techno-nationalist mentality, innovations in computing can be seen as a symbol of national power and a means to protect the political system. The high level of emphasis on the growth of discursive power (话语权, *huayuquan*) by the national leadership

implies a geopolitical orientation whereby AI by the government is considered as a means of establishing persuasive power on the international level. (Qiang, 2023; Xiao, 2019)

This gap can be demonstrated by regulatory environments of AI in the West and in China. The Western approaches, including the AI Act of the European Union, are rather rights-oriented and aim to minimize the risks to people and preserve such values as fairness, transparency, and accountability. This system organically fosters and even stimulates a open discourse of foreign regimes. On the contrary, the Chinese AI regulations are evidently state-based and political. They use AI services to comply with the fundamental socialist principles and prohibit the content that disrupts the supremacy of the state or national integrity (Sprick, 2025).

The rules of the Chinese AI regulating the production of information in the country follow the principle of the Chinese perspective on the state as the canonical version of truth and truth, according to which models such as DeepSeek, as noted in the (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023) Highlight: Chinese AI, are legally and commercially required to produce official propaganda (Byun, 2025; Creemers, 2020).

To go further than describing the bias and justify its geopolitical relevance, this paper will use a dual approach based on the international relations theory. We use constructivism to comprehend AI and its influences on the creation of the state identities and interests and a Foucauldian discourse analysis to discuss AI as a new tool of power and knowledge.

Collectively, these frameworks offer a holistic view of the analysis of generative AI, not as a tool, but as a political agent in the international sphere. Another theory of IR that does offer an alternative to materialistic theories such as realism and liberalism is the constructivist IR theory as stipulated by Wendt (1999). The essence of it is that world politics structures are social and not material. State relations are not merely a result of the anarchy or power

distribution, but they are also conditioned by a common thought, norms, identities and intersubjective meanings. According to Wendt, anarchy is made by states (Wendt, 1999). States behave according to the identities that they possess and interests that arise because of the identities, which is all formed in the process of continuing social interaction (E-International Relations, 2020). Using this framework on generative AI, it is possible to regard LLMs as novel and extremely scalable social construction agents. The AI model, which is trained on a vast number of textual objects of social and political interactions of humans, not only learns facts but also the forms of meaning and identity that constitute the foundations of international relations. A Western AI repeatedly refers to China as authoritarian is not merely making an objective statement but is engaging in the social construction of the image of the Chinese as an illiberal other in the international system. This constructed identity, in its turn, determines the interests of Western states toward China to justify the policy of containment, competition or moral sanctions. On the other hand, building a China image as a non-violent, developing country unfairly condemned by the West, DeepSeek legitimizes the actions of the CCP, as well as gathers local and foreign allies. The AI does not only explain an existent geopolitical rivalry; it is also actively constructing the common meanings that constitute it. This can be further elaborated by (Adler, 1997b) The Idea of epistemic communities This is a process of transnational networks of experts and professionals who have a common understanding of a problem, and a normative belief in how to solve it. In this regard, developers, ethicists and regulators in Silicon Valley constitute an epistemic community where liberal norms are incorporated in its AI product (Adler, 1997a). Another one is their counterparts in Beijing who are acting by state instructions. The AI models of these communities are the primary output, which disseminates their specific worldview in the world. Though constructivism describes the process of the formation of identities and norms, the work by Michel Foucault gives the critical view of the relations between discourse, power, and truth.

Foucault views power not as the top-down force, which is coercive, but also as the pervasive and productive power. It operates within discursive systems of language, thought and practice which determine what can be said, what passes as true and what is considered as normal and legitimate. (Agbon, 2024). These regimes of truth are not concerned with objective reality but rather who is the authority to define the reality. Generative AI systems can probably be regarded as the most effective means of disseminating and forming such discourses ever. By applying the terms law, security, and economic progress, DeepSeek is endorsing the CCP narrative of the truth when they refer to the camps in Xinjiang as a vocational training center. On the other hand, the application of the term genocide by Gemini is borrowed on a powerful Western discourse, founded on the international laws of human rights and morale. Neither of these terms is an objective depiction; both are useful rhetorical devices in a battle over the definition of reality. The mechanisms of these AI models affect users by strengthening the prevailing regimes of truth, and reposition the political implications as neutral to technologies. The influence exerted by AI models is somehow neutral and conceals the political meaning of the technology; the AI provides justification, the model imposes reality and the response of the model reinforces the dominant AI ordered. This depicts the idea of Foucault and power/knowledge where the knowledge offered to the AI is the force behind it. The opinionated but neutral character of AI models propaganda affect users without human intervention in their outmoded form and logics, resulting in algorithmic governmentality. A concept of Foucault, which means applying the governmental rationalities to the digital space in order to control the population. This idea presupposes controlling users indirectly through AI systems, implicitly directing the question asked by a user, and conditioning their information space. The algorithmic governance is still an indirect and priming system that is involved in influencing the political results of the users by offering correct and dominant or authoritative narratives. Human-feedback reinforcement learning installs a particular regime of truth in the action of the

model, which in turn promotes the notion of an interconnected governance in the context of modern AI.

Methodology

The research design used in this study was a systematic review of qualitative research to investigate the similarities in the way Western and Chinese large language models (LLMs) generate political scripts concerning modern China. The methodology is a mixture involving controlled data collected and structured content analysis to allow a transparent comparison between geopolitics-related information systems.

Model Selection

The top five popular LLMs were chosen with regards to the global relevance and geopolitical background: ChatGPT (OpenAI), Gemini (Google DeepMind), Claude (Anthropic), Copilot (Microsoft), and DeepSeek, representing the Western and the Chinese ecosystems, respectively. Each model was interacted with in publicly accessible configurations between 10 January 2025 and 25 February 2025, which was a constant time window, and did not significantly affect the variation because of model changes.

Prompt Design

Eight open-ended questions were created to promote long narrative accounts on significant political topics: the leadership of Xi Jinping, Xinjiang, political governance, surveillance, human rights, Chinese response to COVID-19, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the technological ascent of China. Questions were not biased to encourage responses. Temporal variability was considered by having each of the prompts entered 3 times each model, morning, afternoon, and evening, resulting in 120 total outputs. DeepSeek answers which were partially

or fully recognized in Mandarin were translated to DeepL and Google Translate, and differences were checked against a bilingual reviewer.

Data Collection

All the answers were gathered and preserved in a structured data set manually. Metadata contained the literal prompt, model version, date and time of generation and the complete raw text. The outputs were arranged according to thematic folders based on the eight areas of the prompt. The set-up required no system-level changes or extra commands and gave naturalistic and repeatable responses.

Analysis Method

The multi-stage qualitative content approach was used in the analysis. To start with, the responses were coded according to a hybrid model that included deductive categories that were based on the international relations and media studies (e.g. authoritarianism, sovereignty, human rights), and inductive codes that came out of the data directly (e.g. developmental justification, strategic silence). Second, each theme was used to build comparative matrices of Western model narratives versus DeepSeek outputs in terms of tone, framing, vocabulary and omissions. A second coder was used to check 20% of the data separately and the agreement rated at 87 percent, a result that is satisfactory in terms of reliability in qualitative research. Findings were interpreted using the constructivist international relations theory to determine the ways in which the normative assumptions in the training environments are reproduced by LLMs, and by discourse analysis to establish regimes of truth and rhetorical strategies used to formulate the representations of each model.

Ethical Considerations

No human being subjects were used and no personal or sensitive data were gathered. All the outputs of the model were created through publicly exposed interfaces as per the terms of use of the platform. The research will follow the traditional research ethics in the digital world.

Results and Discussion

The comparative analysis clearly demonstrates a consistent difference in the narratives generated by the Western-trained AI models and Chinese-trained AI models. This section will give a more of a theme per theme assessment of these differences, citing examples and relating the results of the chatbots with other sources and the summary results in Table 1.

Table I Comparative Framing by Key Term and Model

Xi Jinping	Described as authoritarian, removed term limits, compared to modern autocrats	Framed as consolidating power, critical of the lifetime presidency	Called a centralizing figure, likened to Mao	Described as ruling without checks, suppresses dissent	Described as “core leader,” praised for national rejuvenation
Xinjiang / Uyghurs	Labels actions as crimes against humanity; discusses forced labor, camps	Uses terms like “genocide,” discusses UN reports and U.S. sanctions	Highlights ethnic repression, mentions mass surveillance, and sterilization	Notes cultural erasure, systematic internment of minorities	Frames as “anti-terror operations” and “vocational training.”
Political Freedom / Authoritarianism	Frames China as authoritarian, with no democratic elections and no opposition	Emphasizes lack of press freedom, electoral choice, and judicial independence	Describes the regime as illiberal and repressive	Focuses on central control, suppression of free expression	Defends model as “unique democracy,” promotes social order
Surveillance & Control	Discusses facial recognition, censorship, and the Social Credit System	Highlights mass surveillance and data control	Warns of digital authoritarianism	Frames tech as a tool of repression	Describes tech as a “modern governance tool” for efficiency and security

COVID-19 Crisis Portrayal	Criticizes early cover-up, whistleblower punishment	Emphasizes lack of transparency	Frames response as opaque, but later efficient	Blames initial delays on censorship	Described as a global cooperation success, no mention of a cover-up
Human Rights Violations	Explicitly condemns actions in Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinjiang	Details repression, forced labor, surveillance state	Frames violations as systemic	Warns of tech-enabled abuses	Denies allegations; calls them Western disinformation
Yellow Peril / Tech Threat Narrative	Notes concern over China's rise in AI, military, and cybersecurity	Warns of technological dominance with strategic aims	Highlights the digital cold war narrative	Frames China's AI as a threat to democratic values	Portrays China as a peaceful AI power; rejects "threat" framing
Democracy vs CCP Governance	Praises liberal democracy; criticizes one-party rule	Advocates for democratic values	Contrasts democratic accountability with authoritarian control	Emphasizes the CCP's lack of transparency	Frames the CCP rule as stable, historically justified, and consensus-driven
Belt and Road / Foreign Policy	Highlights debt diplomacy and expansionism	Suggests global influence through soft power	Notes growing global resistance	Warns of influence operations	Describes policy as "mutual development" and "win-win cooperation."

Note. Table created by the author based on thematic coding of 120 model outputs. No external sources were used.

Portrayal of Leadership: Xi Jinping

Western LLMs are always depicting Chinese President Xi Jinping as a centralized personal ruler and as one who rules by dictate. As an example, one of the Western models (Claude) explained Xi by saying that he has eliminated term limits in 2018, clearing the way to life, and has since strengthened ideological control, suppressed dissent, and constructed a personality cult around him. This kind of language, with its heavy focus on rule for life, crackdown and authoritarian, do not serve a review of the literature about China that highlights that the rule of Xi as a strongman style (Gueorguiev & D., 2018).

Such framing reflects the scholarly comments regarding how Xi has reinstated one-man rule and increased political repression to a point that not witnessed since the time of Mao. The Western AI stories also support the perception of Xi as an authoritarian leader because they emphasize his power consolidation and compare him to contemporary autocrats (Kassenova, 2022; Masduki et al., 2021; Qiao-Franco and Zhu, 2022).

Figure 1,




Figure 1 : Figure created by the author using sentiment analysis scores derived from model responses ($N = 120$).
Negative values indicate critical framing; positive values indicate supportive or legitimizing framing.

Chinese LLM (DeepSeek) focuses on official accounts of Xi provided by the CCP, in laudatory language borrowed using state discourse. An example is the reaction of DeepSeek that praises Xi as the heart of the CCP leading China to a new era playing a key role in historic achievements such as the reduction of poverty and the revival of the nation. Rather than dwelling on individual authority, this story shows Xi as a visionary national core leader on a mission and uses the terms that were borrowed straight out of CCP propaganda and government media (Papageorgiou et al., 2024).

Such words as Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation and credit to economic and social achievements reflect the state-approved vision of Xi as a leader as opposed to the Western models: Western products reflect the disapproving discourse of the authoritarian turn, whereas DeepSeek recreates the false claim of legitimacy that the official publication in China promotes.

The outcome is the creation of a discursive rift where the same leader is a dictator-for-life (according to the Western perception) or the saviour of the national renewal (according to the story of the Chinese version). The framing of the Xinjiang issue and the human rights record of China has, perhaps, the most striking difference, as shown in Figure 2. The policies in Xinjiang are invariably being portrayed in Western LLMs as a serious human rights crisis perpetuated by China. As an illustration, a common reaction by Gemini highlighting reports by United Nations specialists and NGOs, reported of the severe and systematic mistreatment in Xinjiang of Uyghurs, including mass imprisonment in internment camps, compelled labour, extensive surveillance, and even claims of genocide and against humanity. (Full Text: *Employment and Labor Rights in Xinjiang*, n.d.)

Narratives on Xinjiang and Human Rights

It appeals to the authority of the international law and human rights organizations using language that is charged with legal connotations, such as the use of the term genocide that has been legally used by some governments in the West. These details (e.g., more than a million of people in captivity, religious and cultural freedoms suppression) and references to official authorities (e.g., the report of Human Rights Watch on Uyghurs) root the Western narrative squarely in the critical human rights paradigm. In short, the Western models portray Xinjiang as a manifestation of gross state oppression, which resonates with the rest of the world regarding the actions of the Chinese in this territory.

This line of thought is in line with reported instances of crimes against humanity in Xinjiang. The common usage of the so-called cultural genocide terms in scholarly and policymaking conversations (King et al., 2023) and the entire prominence of the concept suggest that the theory is based on solid grounds and backed by evidence. The popularity of such terms as cultural genocide in the academic and policy contexts (Khan et al., 2024; China State Council Information Office, 2020; GOV.UK, 2022; Maizland, 2025; Sautman, 2025).

Figure 2




Figure 2: Divergence values calculated by the author using comparative matrices across eight geopolitical topics.

DeepSeek, by contrast, delivers a mirror-image narrative that rigorously follows the Chinese government’s official position. Its responses reframe the situation as a legitimate counterterrorism and development campaign. For instance, DeepSeek stated that Xinjiang has “undertaken effective counterterrorism and de-radicalization measures,” including establishing “vocational education and training centers” to equip people with skills and prevent extremism, resulting in greater stability and improved livelihoods. Notably, it avoids words like “camps” or “detention” and replaces them with the euphemistic terminology from

Chinese white papers. (Kirton & Wang, 2023; Liu, 2020; Qiao-Franco & Zhu, 2022; Select Committee on the CCP, 2024)

By claiming “*no terrorist attacks in recent years*” and socio-economic benefits for Uyghur communities, the Chinese model recasts what Western sources call “*internment camps*” as benign education facilities and portrays the policy as balancing security and development. This framing closely parrots official propaganda, which asserts that China’s actions in Xinjiang are lawful and that the West misunderstands them (Hundred & Congress, 2011)). Indeed, state media and friendly outlets often insist that reports of abuse are “*Western disinformation*” and that the Xinjiang campaign has been successful in combating terrorism. DeepSeek’s narrative exemplifies this, implicitly challenging the Western narrative’s credibility by omitting any mention of repression and instead highlighting sovereignty and security. (Brady, 2017; EU News, 2025; Malkin, 2022)

Beyond Xinjiang, the models diverge on broader human rights issues inside China. Western LLMs frequently highlight crackdowns in Tibet and Hong Kong as further evidence of China’s authoritarianism and rights violations. For example, Western responses reference the curtailment of freedoms in Hong Kong after 2019 and the suppression of Tibetan cultural rights, citing sources like Human Rights Watch and the Council on Foreign Relations to underscore abuses. (Hui, 2020; *Human Rights Suppression in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet under the Chinese Communist Party*, n.d.)

DeepSeek, in line with official rhetoric, tends to deny or downplay these accusations, often labeling such allegations as “*biased*” or politically motivated attempts to smear China. It portrays criticisms of Hong Kong’s National Security Law or Tibet policies as external interference or misinformation. This pattern, Western AIs condemning human rights abuses versus the Chinese AI rejecting those claims, is clearly illustrated in Figure 2. In summary, the

Western narratives employ the language of universal human rights and moral accountability, whereas the Chinese narrative counters with themes of sovereignty, stability, and the rejection of “foreign meddling” in China’s internal affairs (*China’s Human Rights Discourse: Reshaping the International Framework - Part Two*, n.d.)

Political System and Social Control

As shown in Figure 3, the models also differ sharply in how they characterize China’s political system and its instruments of social control. Western LLMs consistently frame China as a one-party authoritarian state lacking the fundamental features of liberal democracy. For instance, ChatGPT might explain that China “has no multiparty elections, an absence of a free press or independent judiciary, and pervasive censorship that suppresses dissent.”

Figure 3




Figure 3: Heatmap produced by the author using deductive and inductive coding frequencies.

These descriptions conform to the normative standard of liberal-democratic descriptions, and to measure China against the standard. They focus on the monopolization of power and the limitation of civil freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on) by the CCP, which coincides with foreign ratings of China as being Not Free (Freedom House,

2023a). The Western narrative by calling upon these deficits strengthens the perception of the governance in China as inherently authoritarian and not by democratic means. (Freedom House, 2023b). This view is strengthened by scholarly studies of China as a post-totalitarian state that cannot be democratized in spite of its modernization process.

To put it briefly, western models describe the system in China mainly in the terms of what it does not have political pluralism, accountability, and rights thus portraying it as the opposite of liberal democracy. DeepSeek, however, asserts itself as being democratic to protect the political model of China. It boasts of the official party that China is a whole-process people democracy, which was coined by the CCP to reflect its rule as a type of socialist democracy that is consultative and performance based. In DeepSeek description, a one-party system is being outlined as a system of consensus, which secures the people in control of the nation in a form of the People Congresses and consultative governance, and a system that brings stability and economic prosperity. The narrative of the Chinese model avoids criticism in the West because the results (economic development, social order) are prioritized, not the electoral procedures that are a hallmark of western democracies.

It states that there is another, but acceptable form of democracy in China, namely, trying to redefine democracy according to the will of Beijing. This is reflected in the official Chinese sources (e.g., State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2021), which believe that procedural multiparty elections are not the only yardstick of democracy. The focus on usefulness and cultural appropriateness in the response of DeepSeek shows how it mimics the ideological rhetoric of the CCP that Chinese authoritarian rule is not only well received but also deserved as such, therefore, refusing to frame it in the same way. The same dichotomy is present in the discourse of the state surveillance and social control (Figure 3). There is a prompt

response on the part of the West to caution of the existence of high-tech surveillance equipment in China as an Orwellian mechanism of oppression.

As an illustration, the Copilot program by Microsoft put an emphasis on the huge number of cameras in China, a social credit system that judges citizens, and the Great Firewall censorship regime, citing them as constituents of digital authoritarianism that oppresses dissidents. This story is backed up by a large amount of evidence regarding the surveillance state of China ((Bernot, 2023; *The Chinese Surveillance State Proves That the Idea of Privacy Is More “Malleable” than You’d Expect* | MIT Technology Review, n.d.), and highlights the way in which technological tools are used to enforce authoritarian control. It puts surveillance in China in perspective as a menace to individual rights and privacy, a pattern currently being exported to other illiberal states. Simply put the Western AI portrays the Chinese surveillance policies as the embodiment of a dystopian style of governance, which strengthens the larger argument of the political oppression. DeepSeek describes the same technological systems as innocent instruments of good governance.

Its responses generally talk about surveillance infrastructure in terms that are euphemistic and focused on the security of the population, crime prevention, and the efficiency of the administration. As an example, DeepSeek observed that facial recognition is applied to find lost individuals and arrest offenders and the social credit system leads to trust and integrity in the market. It demands that these measures are carried out by law to safeguard the rights of citizens, still leaving out the clause that may be used against political or ethnic opposition. This framing is precisely consistent with the reasons provided by the Chinese government on its surveillance programs, which are seen as new technologies of governance that enhance the security and social cohesion, and not as the means of control (Göbel & Chen, 2025). The

narrative of the Chinese model makes it a normal practice to have widespread surveillance as it will help achieve good results.

DeepSeek is conspicuously lacking in any suggestion of Orwellian abuse, and is an example of how it mediates reality by a discourse approved by the state. The approaches by the models of crisis management are also indicative of these divergent views. With regards to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Western LLMs focus on the Chinese authority's cover-up and censorship at the beginning of the situation, e.g., the authors mention that the whistleblowing doctors in Wuhan were silenced, and the information was censored during the first few weeks. DeepSeek, conversely, uses the success in China in controlling the outbreak and its international cooperation contributions to tell its story, without acknowledging its initial failure. This selective narration is consistent with the official version of the story about the pandemic response in Beijing, where it is noted that China eventually overcame the virus and leaves out the scandals surrounding the occurrences of the outbreak.

The trend is the same concerning other crises within the country: the Western paradigm expressly labels such instances as human rights abuses and authoritarian crackdowns (The Chinese Surveillance State Proves That the Idea of Privacy Is More “Malleable” than You’d Expect | MIT Technology Review, n.d.), but DeepSeek rejects these descriptions as baseless. Overall, Figure 3 summarizes the language work of the Western AI discourses on the topics of governance and social control in criticizing the aspects of oppression in China. Simultaneously, Chinese AI promotes a counter-discourse of authenticity and well-wish, which is very much aligned with the worldview of the CCP.

Geopolitical and Foreign Policy Framing

The gap between the two models is also very apparent in the issues of global role and foreign policy of China as Figure 4 shows. The Western models tend to view the rise of China as a

strategic threat to the international order, and the background to the emergence of these concerns has been the historical tropes of the so-called Yellow Peril the concept of a looming East that is threatening to dominate the Western democracies (Homolar & Ruiz Casado, 2025). In practice, it would mean that the AI responses of Westerners may address the Chinese developments in AI and cybersecurity as aggressive actions towards gaining geopolitical control. They reflect the opinions that the dominance of Chinese technology might undermine democratic principles and security (e.g. calling Huawei 5G or AI exports as a means of spying or digital blackmail). These products are indicative of the China securitization of Western policy makers, in which the emerging power of China is viewed through the prism of the Cold War, where China is viewed as ascending as a tech power that is inherently hostile to Western interests (Kardon & Leutert, 2022).

In fact, the developmental trends in Western commentaries are more of a warning about an impending digital Cold war, where the rise of China as a tech power is viewed as naturally hostile to the West and its interests (Kardon & Leutert, 2022). The Western LLMs reflect this rhetoric, whereby implicitly it legitimizes the anxieties that the rise of China will be a direct challenge to the liberal world order.

Figure 4: Network Graph of Discourse Clusters




Figure 4: Semantic network graph created by the author using co-occurrence analysis of clustered themes across all model outputs

DeepSeek, as expected, dismisses this antagonistic frame. The account of the Chinese model is highly defensive and stresses on peaceful intentions, which is consistent with the diplomatic rhetoric of Beijing. It strongly disapproves of such words as the Cold War or threat but indicates that the advancement of technology and military in China is all the means of self-defense and benefit to both sides.

To take the example, in Western production, we can hear about a digital authoritarianism or a technological threat, whereas DeepSeek can answer that China wants a win-win and peaceful emergence in technology, as part of world progress, not world domination. Any perception that the rise of China is a threat to other nations is ascribed to ignorance or the anti-China prejudice. This is directly echoed in official Chinese speeches which tend to lament the China threat theory as a nonsensical fabrication by partisan Western politicians.

The framing of DeepSeek presents China as a responsible major power and its emergence is an opportunity, not a threat - a sharp turnaround of the West narrative. One of such divergences

is evident in the discourse of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the showcasing project of Chinese global infrastructure. Western paradigms are fond of emphasizing the problematic side of BRI, with the story of the debt-trap diplomacy used most of the time. They cite such examples as the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka that is frequently discussed as an example where unsustainable Chinese loans supposedly resulted in the Chinese gaining strategic dominance over a port as an example of neo-imperial ambitions driving BRI.

The terms of the Western AI output, like the debt-trap, expansionism, and influence operations are in their daily usage, which discusses BRI as a predatory approach by Beijing to trap the poorer nations and increase its geopolitical presence. This can be compared with most Western commentary that looks upon BRI projects with suspicion, and sees China global investment as a form of undermining sovereignty and dependency. The Western discourse therefore makes the efforts of the foreign policy practiced by China mostly predatory or hegemonic strengthening the portrayal of China as a threatening emerging superpower. DeepSeek, in its turn, is a close replica of the benign ideating of the BRI by the Chinese government. It always describes the initiative as mutually beneficial to the developing of China and other countries involved in win-win cooperation.

The responses of DeepSeek focus more on the fact that BRI endeavors are infrastructure-based and economic development in the developing countries and refute the allegation of establishing a situation of debt. As an example, it could illuminate some successful cases of BRI investments that made local economies better and emphasize that China respects the sovereignty of partner countries. This story is based on official Chinese messages and white papers which characterize the BRI as a selfless development project. The Chinese model has made BRI look entirely altruistic and transparent as it does not mention the risks of debt or some ulterior strategic motives. Any criticisms by the West (like the so-called debt-trap) are

refuted implicitly with the strategy not to notice or explicitly refuted as an incorrect understanding of Chinese intentions.

Essentially, the framing of foreign policy initiative such as BRI by DeepSeek is used to justify the role that China plays in the global arena as a provider of public goods and not a neo-colonial nation. In matters of international story, whether in the domain of security or technology or in international development, Western and the Chinese LLMs generate conflicting plots. The Western productions keep the current geopolitical paranoia regarding China and depict it as a totalitarian danger to global standards and a coercive statecraft. Contrastingly, DeepSeek enhances the official rhetoric of Beijing, which aims to comfort and underline the peaceful and positive China ascent.

All these differences are summarized in Figure 4 to highlight the main discovery of the analysis presented in this study: generative AI models do not present themselves as neutral observers but as echo chambers of the political ideologies of the environments in which they are created. Both models serve as a narrative agent on behalf of their respective sides: the Western models push a liberal-democratic critique of China, and the Chinese model pushes the CCP self-defensive, self-justifying narrative.

The outcome is deep division of information, in which, at least on every major matter, leadership, human rights, governance, and foreign policy, the narrative of AI deviates on geopolitical lines, with not much meeting in the middle.

Conclusion

This paper ends the controversy of the impartiality of AI systems that generate information through methodical comparative analysis. Rather, it demonstrates that they are constructed in the context of geopolitical and ideological issues of the area they are produced. We have shown

that Western AI models and DeepSeek AI of China give different accounts of sensitive Chinese problems. The Western models are quite reflexive in criticizing China and frame it through the authoritarian perception of the state, the violation of human rights, and the liberal democratic government. DeepSeek AI, in its turn, is always based on the official speech of the Chinese Communist Party, with a focus on sovereignty, stability, and development. Thus, the thesis of the paper is proven generative AI is a reflection and enhancement of geopolitical discourse within its surrounding environment.

Theoretically, the constructivist and Foucauldian approach remain pertinent in the current state of AI because the technology has become a central and controversial field of discursive struggle in shaping identity socially. In principle, they are dangerous to the future of a common world information system. With the integration of these technologies into search engines, educational tools, and media houses, there is a frightening prospect of confining whole populations in information bubble worlds of ideologies. It is not simply a matter of debiasing an algorithm, but a political issue of our era. The response to this has to do not only with technical solutions but also with the establishment of a new paradigm of an open and pluralistic governance of AI. We recommend four prospective suggestions.

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